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Abstract
Foucaults studies of the relations between power and knowledge provide an alternative
methodology for the studies of knowledges and their organizing. A methodology, which is
referred to as genealogy. Process and pluralism is at the heart of genealogy. It thereby
challenges unitary sciences and emphasises the concrete, independent and contextual
character of knowledges. It seeks the present in the history of struggles among differentials.
It focusses on uncovering the different knowledges and their interaction that are behind
organized patterns. Finally, it strongly encourages a focus on specific practices like
techniques, projects, tasks etc. in and around which the differences play together and interact
in specific ways. In these operations, genealogy turns science on its head, because it opposes
any unifying narrative and allows knowledges to maintain their own identity. The analysis
thus becomes of an ascending kind, where more general phenomena emerge through the
detailed study of practices.
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1. Introduction
Foucaults studies of the relations between power and knowledge - also referred to as
power/knowledge (Foucault, 1978, 1979, 1980) - provide an alternative methodology for the
study of knowledges and their organizing. It is called genealogy and finds its roots in
Nietzsche (1885, 1887). It is a method for studying knowledges and their organizing in their
historical and geographical context. The emphasis of genealogy is caught in the notion ‘local
knowledges’ which denote concrete, independent and contextual knowledges. They are
concrete since they reside in the activities in which knowledges materialize themselves.
They are independent because they have an own identity, which however does not mean that
other knowledges are beyond influence. On the contrary local knowledges are constantly
reacting and responding in an interplay with other knowledges in a specific context. An
emphasis on process and pluralism is inherent in the notion. Pluralism, because the local
independent character carries with it an emphasis on multiplicity. Process, because
knowledges and their organizing are always in flux. Words and actions do not keep their
meanings across time and space but are much more dynamic and fluid. Power is what
organizes knowledges in Foucaults writings but it is not necessarily a negative power in the
form of A getting B to do something he otherwise would not do (Clegg, 1998). It is a
culturally embedded power residing ‘...in the fibre and fabric of everyday life’ (Clegg &
Hardy, 1996:631) Viewed in this way, power is not very different from culture or organizing
(Weick, 1979), although there are certain tactics involved in calling it power. The point is
that genealogy has a much broader application than just to studies of power and can be
adopted in a wide array of studies dealing with social patterns and their dynamics. The
emphasis on process and pluralism is found in many relatively new perspectives in
organizational analysis. For example in fragmentation perspectives on organizational culture
(Martin 1992. Frost & Martin, 1996), in Weick (1979, 1995), more recently in narrative
approaches (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1995. Czarniawska, 1997), and finally also in
postmodern perspectives (Lyotard, 1984).
Genealogy is also controversial. First, it does not just focus on social patterns and the
knowledge they create but also on their suppression and destruction processes. Social
patterns have a creative side as well as a destructive side. Genealogy pays attention to ‘the
marginalised voices.’ Those knowledges that have been crowded out from the center stage
and are only materialized on special occasions. Thus, genealogy also implies a focus on the2
‘darker’ and more controversial sides of organized patterns. The word ‘power’ catches this
side of organizations much better than culture or Weick’s concept ‘organizing’ (Weick,
1979) even if all three of them relate to the organizing of knowledges. It also reveals that
genealogy is a critical approach. Second, because it challenges assumptions that are deeply
rooted in organizational analysis. In particular, it challenges the view that organizations are
unitary and that they follow relatively continuous stages of development. In this unifying
world the focus has been on revealing the shared common pattern of knowledge or meaning
that is assumed to run through and control everything. A focus which to a large extent has
crossed paradigmatic borders (Smircich, 1983. Schultz, 1990. Hatch, 1997). In this unifying
world, local knowledges have no place. They refuse to be subjected to some totalitarian
truth. After all this is why they are called local knowledges. Process and pluralism are
opposed to totalitarian sciences. Both words are the opposites of sameness. Thus, they are
fundamentally inconsistent with unitary approaches and require a methodology like for
example genealogy.
This paper discusses the overall principles of genealogy. It is highly relevant for exploring
complex and dynamic processes of organizational changes in their historical and
geographical context. It is structured in three main sections. First, the concept of local
knowledges is discussed. This is followed by a discussion of genealogy and its conception of
history. Second, The practical implications of genealogy including five methodological
precautions are deduced. The final section consists of concluding remarks.
2. Local Knowledges
‘What it (genealogy) really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local,
discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary
body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some
true knowledge and arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects.’
(Foucault, 1976:83, italics added)
The local, discontinuous, disqualified and illegitimate knowledges are what was previously
referred to as just local knowledges. Why are they described as discontinuous, disqualified
and illegitimate? They have these characteristics in relation to what Foucault calls a ‘unitary3
body of theory.’ Genealogy is presented as a reaction against unifying theories. Foucault
explicitly uses the word ‘anti-science’ (1976:83) of genealogy, which reveals that Foucault
thinks of science as dominated by these so-called unitary sciences. In this regard, he present
the latter in its most extreme form to pinpoint his own points more clearly.
Why is Foucault so strongly opposed to unifying sciences? In his opinion they are
totalitarian. Their business is transformation and rejection of knowledges. They are
preoccupied with identifying common patterns. In this operation they will either transform
knowledges to fit with the overall guiding principle or reject them on the basis that they are
irrelevant. A well-known word for a totalitarian science is ‘meta narrative’ (Lyotard, 1984)
or  ‘grand narrative’ (Ritzer, 1996:609-610). Genealogy is thus opposed to any grand
narrative, which is undoubtedly why Foucault along with Lyotard has been called
postmodern (See for example Seidman (ed.), 1994. Natoli & Hutcheon (ed.), 1993) since
genealogy can be defined in exactly the same way as Lyotard defines postmodernism,
namely as ‘incredulity towards meta narratives’ (Lyotard, 1984:xxiv). That is, Lyotard
actually characterizes himself as postmodern. The word ‘postmodernism’ is however itself a
grand narrative since it gathers many different approaches under the same umbrella.
Probably this is why Foucault never used the label about himself. It reflects what he
opposes. More seriously these grand narratives become increasingly ambiguous with a
growing number of approaches within it. Therefore, I will not use the label here. It is apt to
generate too many misunderstandings.
Foucaults emphasis on local knowledges is already - ‘Already’ because it was before his
genealogical period (Burrell, 1988) - manifested in ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’ (1972),
where he uses the word ‘discontinuity,’ to denote independent histories - they are not
reflections of any grand narrative.
‘From the political mobility at the surface down to the slow movements of ‘material
civilization’, ever more levels of analysis have been established: each has its own
peculiar discontinuities and patterns; and as one descends to the deepest levels, the
rhythms become broader. Beneath the rapidly changing history of governments,
wars, and famines, there emerge other, apparently unmoving histories: the history of
sea routes, the history of corn or of gold mining, the history of drought and4
irrigation, the history of crop rotation, the history of balance achieved by the human
species between hunger and abundance’ (Foucault, 1972:3).
That is ever more levels with their own discontinuities and patterns have been established.
Society cannot be reduced to one history but must be seen as a gathering and mixture of a
manifold of particular histories, which interact and play with each other in many different
ways in many different contexts. In such a world totalitarian sciences are not of much help,
since they impose a single order on a highly differentiated and fragmented material. They
become a hindrance to see the differences and complexities involved in the shaping of any
social pattern. Foucault is very harsh in his judgment of totalitarian sciences. In his opinion,
they are ‘a hindrance to research’ (Foucault, 1976:81). A funny little detail may illustrate his
opinions of totalitarian sciences very clearly. In ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge,’ Foucault
continuously uses the term ‘The History of Ideas’ to characterize totalitarian sciences. An
inspiration from Marx, who in 1846 uses the same term to characterize something that is
invented - a form of universal reason, which comes in very handy when someone cannot
explain facts otherwise. According to Marx, this notion which he also calls ‘sacred history’
is opposed to ‘profane history - a history of man’ (Marx, 1846:136-138). While sacred
history is invented, profane history is grounded in ‘real’ history. The point is simple. The
unifying concepts of totalitarian sciences are inventions, which are not really grounded in
the objective facts. Genealogy however is concerned with writing ‘real history.’ Following
Burrell & Morgan’s classification schema (1979), one may wonder how come many of these
totalitarian sciences (for example functionalism) are called ‘objective sciences,’ since the
logic they propose is invented. Not because these unifying sciences are necessarily bad. The
abstractions, they propose can be very handy, solve many problems, and facilitate more
systematic thinking. To refer to them as objective is however misleading. It gives a wrong
impression of what they are and it becomes a hindrance to question them.
In relation to totalitarian sciences, genealogy becomes ‘an insurrection of subjugated
knowledges’ (Foucault, 1976:81) Two kinds of knowledges are insurrected:
1. On the one hand I am referring to the historical contents that have been buried and
disguised in a functionalist coherence or formal systemisation. Concretely, it is not a
semiology of the life of the asylum, it is not even a sociology of delinquency, that5
has made it possible to produce and effective criticism of the asylum and likewise of
the prison, but rather the immediate emergence of historical contents. And this is
simply because only the historical contents allow us to rediscover the ruptural effects
of struggle that the order imposed by functionalist or systematising thought is
designed to mask. Subjugated knowledges are thus those blocs of historical
knowledge which were present but disguised within the body of functionalist and
systematising theory....’ (Foucault, 1976:81-82)
Thus, on the one hand Foucault speaks of historical contents, which are present in scientific
analysis but disguised within a unifying theory, here referred to as functionalist and
systematising theory. In ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,’ Foucault argues that the
genealogist  ‘...must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality...’
(1971:76). This is really what it is all about. Events must be recorded independently of any
unifying and thereby systematising theory. Events are what they are, and nothing else. Do
not impose an abstract and unitary order on the material. It will disguise and transform
knowledges in the name of the grand narrative. Knowledges are present but are not allowed
to speak for themselves. They are contaminated from the start and presents a distorted
picture of the development of history. In ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge.’ Foucault
mentions tradition, development or evolution and spirit which each serve a specific function
in that they can link dispersed elements into a unity or in Foucault’s word, ‘rethink the
dispersion of history in the form of the same’ (Foucault, 1972:21). Foucault’s point is
exactly that these elements should not be transformed to sameness, but instead should be
regarded as what they are; a collection of dispersed events. Thus, Foucault wishes to present
those knowledges as what they are in Foucaults opinion; namely knowledges with their own
history and identity and which exist in their own specific context. It is among others through
the revival of these kinds of local knowledges - also referred to as ‘erudite knowledges’
(Foucault 1976:82-83) - that Foucaults wishes to give a more proper picture of the
conditions in which systems of power/knowledge evolve and change.
2....a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task
or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy,
beneath the required level of scientificity. I also believe that it is through the re-
emergence of these low-ranking knowledges, these unqualified, even directly
disqualified knowledges (such as that of the psychiatric patient, of the ill person, of6
the nurse, of the doctor - parallel and marginal as they are to the knowledge of
medicine - that of the delinquent etc.) and which involve what I call a popular
knowledge (le savoir des gens) though it is far from being a general commonsense
knowledge but is on the contrary a particular, local, regional knowledge, a
differential knowledge uncapable of unanimity and which owes its force only to the
harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it...’ (Foucault,
1976:83)
Secondly, it is the revival of directly disqualified knowledges. Knowledges that traditionally
are doomed unscientific or illegitimate and on this basis is disregarded from the analysis.
Particular, local, regional knowledges. In short marginalised knowledges. This makes them
tricky. Per definition their voices are not manifested with any great weight in the material.
They are most often latent. Rejection is not necessarily a conscious strategy of unifying
sciences. It is a consequence of the focus on common patterns, which puts the spotlight on
the centerstage. But then there is something that is not there, namely the marginalised
voices. These are the losers in the game. Those knowledges which are only rarely heard.
Those knowledges - not people - which lost the battle and therefore almost disappeared from
the scene. The marginalised knowledges require a special methodology. Pay attention to the
peripheral areas of the material. Do not just concentrate on what is common or general in the
material, but also what is unusual and rare and somehow does not seem to fit.
In relation to unifying theories, local knowledges open up and give room for alternative
knowledges. It allows them to speak up. This is one of the reasons that genealogy is
controversial. But as for the word ‘postmodernism’ there are also problems with the term
‘local knowledges.’ After all, they are only local in relation to something that is more global.
Thus, it could be argued that in relation to something more local, local knowledges are
themselves totalitarian. It is a fundamental problem relating to the same-different problem.
The simple use of words and names also transforms differences into sameness. Thus,
language constitutes an abuse. Is Foucault’s critique of the unifying sciences then relevant?
Doesn’t he deceive himself and make the same mistakes as the science, he is opposed to? To
perceive it in this fashion is to miss the point. It forgets that the scientist actually has a
relatively stable point of reference. The empirical phenomenon he wishes to examine and
subsequently the material he collects about it. The material - interviews, documents,7
observations etc. - will comprise and touch many different issues. It is a mixture of different
contexts and different actors entering the stage at different moments in time. The point of
genealogy is to let these different elements retain their own identity and not to try to
transform into some unitary form. But these single different elements are themselves often
presented as unitary forms, even though they themselves can be subjected to fragmentation.
It is unavoidable. Of course the investigation can be carried along by fragmenting the
different elements themselves. But this should only be done if it seems to be important in
regard to the subject of investigation. Otherwise, the investigation moves away from its
target.
2.1. The Tasks of the Genealogist
‘If he (the genealogist) listens to history, he finds that there is something altogether
different behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they
have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from
alien forms. Examining the history of reason, he learns that it was born in an
altogether reasonable fashion - from chance;’ (Foucault, 1971:78, italics added)
Foucault’s view of history is clearly dialectical. If we go back into history, we will find
nothing more than differences and struggles. As Benson (1977) observes, any social pattern
will be one of many possibilities. As Foucault ironically describes it, the history of reason
was born in an altogether reasonable fashion - from chance. Historical beginnings are lowly.
They are ironic, inconsistent and unpredictable. And beginnings that seem pure and truly
grand are nothing more than rather small events interacting in a specific way with other
events. This sarcastic comment about the birth of mankind in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy,
History’ illustrates the point very clearly.
‘We wished to awaken the feeling of mans sovereignty by showing his divine birth:
this path is now forbidden, since a monkey stands at the entrance’ (Nietzsche in
Foucault, 1971:79).
Thus, mans sovereignty can be questioned. It is not something that is given by some
objective law or rationality. It was something that emerged through the continuous struggle8
of differentials and it was something that was born from chance. There is not a timeless and
essential secret behind things. They have no essence or perhaps more precisely there is no
common essence. Instead the essence is continuously produced and changed in an interplay
between different knowledges in a specific historical context. Thus, the essence is not stable
but is in flux. There is no secret essence. Things are what they appear to be and do not reveal
any deeper and common truth. In this dialectical world, the genealogist has two fundamental
tasks, which is discussed by Foucault in regard to the differences between the German words
‘Urkunft,’ ‘Herkunft’ and ‘Entstehung’ used by Nietzsche. According to Foucault, Nietzsche
was right that ‘Enstehung’ and ‘Herkunft’ are more exact in capturing the true objective of
genealogy (Foucault, 1971:80). Urkunft is a word relating to ‘the miraculous origin’ that
Foucault and Nietzsche are so strongly opposed to. It is an invention, a sleight-of-hand, an
artifice (Foucault, 1971:77).
Herkunft is translated into ‘descent’  and it captures exactly that phenomena like truth,
group, and even individuals are not to be thought of as unified phenomena. Instead it allows
the sorting out of different traits that contributed to the phenomena. An examination will
focus on the myriad of events which made their contribution to descent. In this sense,
genealogy is aimed at fragmenting what was thought unified and immobile. It will reveal the
heterogeneity behind descent (Foucault, 1971:82-83). This constitutes the first task of the
genealogist. The sorting out of the different traits, which have had any significance. The
criterion for determining what is significant is in principle straightforward. It is determined
by the empirical phenomenon that is investigated and the material that is collected about it.
What is said in the interviews or in other connections, what is recorded on paper or what can
be observed. In short, the artifacts determine what is significant, not the researcher. This is a
good principle, even if it cannot be carried out completely. Of course the researcher makes a
difference but this does not mean that he cannot give the artifacts a big room to speak for
themselves.
‘Entstehung’ is translated into ‘Emergence’ - the moment of arising (Foucault, 1971:83) -
but we are not seeking a particular point in history where a given rationality, which from
then has controlled everything is established. It is more tactical. It designates the struggle of
particular forces in particular points in time. The analysis of the Entstehung must delineate
this interaction (Foucault, 1971:83). Enstehung is the entry of forces. Often, but not9
necessarily, only inscribed in the peripheral areas of the material. In Foucaults word it is
‘...the leap from the wings to the center stage’ (Foucault, 1971:84). The Entstehung
designates the place where different systems of power/knowledge meet face-to-face. Not
necessarily with a big bang. The confrontation can be much more humble and seem
insignificant at a first glance. Further, the power/knowledge systems are not necessarily
equal. Often the places of the ‘Entstehung’ are not manifested very clearly in the material.
This relates to the tricky part of uncovering marginalised knowledges. The Entstehung
provides a rare opportunity where some of the marginalised voices are not silent, which is
one of the main reasons that the analysis of the Entstehung is important.
3. Methodological Guidelines
‘Genealogy is grey, meticulous and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of
entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and
recopied many times.’ (Foucault, 1971:76).
Genealogy is boring. If the analysis is not just based on documents, observations and
interview transcripts can be added, which mix a manifold of different context in a confusing
order. These confused documents, observations and interview transcripts need to be ordered
in time and space. That is, the pieces must be ordered in regard to chronology, context and
actors. A major task, since genealogy also requires a major accumulation of source material.
Therefore genealogy is boring unless one likes the monotonous work of going through page
by page and piece by piece in order to place them in the right chronology and context. It is
also very time-consuming and a mental burden, since the genealogist from time to time feels
that he is not getting anywhere.
But genealogy is also exciting. It gives a great overview and touch with the material and is
thus an exciting concrete and detailed alternative to the abstractions the unitary sciences
have produced so many of. Often, it is experienced that the sheer ordering of pieces in time
and space gives a totally different view of the process than expected. Much of the material
really does speak for itself. Often, it is revealed how beautiful words turn out to be less
beautiful in the real world. Thus, with its meticulous procedures, genealogy to some extent
avoids deception. In itself, this is a very good reason for doing it. There is a second reason.10
In the process, the genealogist stumbles over details that can lead to a more thorough
understanding of the subject of investigation. ‘The leap from the wings to the center stage.’
Often the Entstehung is found in the peripheral areas. Therefore, do not overlook the details
in the name of ‘the general picture.’ It is often in minor, seemingly insignificant details that
the really important connections are revealed. There is an obvious risk of running into dead
ends or blind spots but on the other hand, details can lead to higher levels of understanding
(Flyvbjerg, 1991a:91-92). What is a detail and why can they be so interesting? They denote
something that is somehow strange and surprising in the material. Where you have the sense
that something is somehow wrong. They can be manifested directly in the material, in an
inserted remark, in handwriting on a printed record or even in the appendix of some report.
A detail may also be a non-event. An absence of action where action could have been
expected. Why are they interesting? It is the place where different power/knowledge systems
meet face-to-face. It is the place where a different context and history suddenly enters the
picture. It is the place where something that is latent enters the center stage and becomes
manifested in words and actions. It may not be for a very long time. The consequences may
not be very big. Often they are only there for a glimpse of time. But they need to be pursued
because it is often on the borderlines, where systems of power/knowledge are challenged
and where they produce their real effects in relation to other power/knowledge systems that
the most clear pictures of them are revealed.
Genealogy basically consists of two steps. The first step is the archaeology. The second is
actually called genealogy although both steps are inherent in genealogy. Thus, there is no
opposition between archaeology and genealogy as some authors have argued. For example,
Burrell (1988) argues that Foucaults writings can be distinguished in an archaeological and
genealogical period, which is right. Foucault presents it in this fashion. However,
archaeology is inherent - not opposed to - genealogy. Burrell does not get around the
differences, since he presents archaeology as a search for the same (1988:229) while
genealogy is a search for the different. Especially, the use of the word ‘same’ is very
confusing since Foucault presents archaeology as a method opposed to the search for
sameness. This is not the difference. Archaeology is subordinated genealogy. It is used in the
early phases of a genealogical analysis.11
‘If we were to characterise it in two terms, then ‘archaeology’ would be the
appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and genealogy would
be the tactics whereby, on the basis of this description of local discursivities, the
subjected knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play’
(Foucault, 1976:85)
Archaeology is grey. This is the boring task of genealogy. It is defined as a non-interpretive
discipline and a systematic rewriting of history (Foucault, 1972:138-140). This simple
‘disinterested’ (Flyvbjerg, 1991a:98) rewriting of history constitutes the first step in a
genealogy. The second part of genealogy is more ‘interested’ (Flyvbjerg, 1991a:99). It is the
tactics, whereby the subjected knowledges are brought into play. It is thus an interpretive
method. It is more selective and organizes the material in order to illuminate the problems of
which the analysis is concerned; power, rationality, technology or something else. It is
interpretive not in the sense it tries to figure out how individuals interpret the world.
Genealogy is more humble. It is strictly based on what can be seen, heard or sensed. In short
what is objectified. Individuals are not important. They exist only through their words and
actions. An appropriate method, when the subject matter is the organizing of many people.
To interpret what is going on in the heads of individuals quickly becomes way too complex
and overambitious. This is one of the main problems of cognition (See Geertz, 1973 and
Cook & Yanow, 1993 on this point). Further - and this is one of the main messages of
Foucaults writings - individuals do not create the world. Individuals are moulded, not in a
singular fashion but in a multiple fashion by many different contexts and histories that
penetrate the human body.
3.1. Five Methodological Precautions
Genealogy is a reversal of unitary science. It turns it upside down. It focusses on local
knowledges instead of grand narratives. What does this means in regard to methodology and
organizational analysis? The answer is simple. It reverses the focus from the centers
(organizing principles) to the practices. In Foucaults version, the focus is not on power as a
specific center but on power as embedded in practices (knowledges). This is described more
carefully in five methodological precautions.12
1. ‘It (the analysis) should be concerned with power at its extremities, in its ultimate
destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more
regional and local forms and institutions.’ (Foucault, 1976:96, italics added)
The analysis should be concerned with power in its ultimate destinations; in its more
regional forms and institutions. The analysis moves away from trying to locate the center. It
is precisely the latter form of science that is totalitarian. Instead the focus is on what power
does concretely. To study local knowledges in organizational analysis means to study
organizational practices on their own term. They are, what they are and nothing else. They
must be recorded in their singularity without referring them to a specific center, which is
presumed to control them. Thus, do not try to locate a specific center, but focus on what
power does concretely. Where it materializes itself in concrete practices.
2. ‘It is a case of studying power at the point where its intention, if it has one, is
completely invested in its real and effective practices. What is needed is a study of
power in its external visage, at the point where it is in direct and immediate
relationship with that which we can provisionally call its object, its target, its field of
application, there - that is to say - where it installs itself and produces its real
effects.’ (Foucault, 1976:97)
The point is repeated. Stick to the practices. It is here that systems of power/knowledge are
expressed most clearly. Focus on specific activities like tasks, techniques, procedures,
strategies, projects etc. around which the differences play together and interact in a specific
way in a specific context. It is also in the practices that the systems of power/knowledge are
confronted, opposed and resisted. Practices have a double and paradoxical value. They
transmit, produce and reinforce organizational practices but also undermine and expose
them (Adapted from Foucault, 1979b:340). What about for example environments,
structures, cognitions and levels of analysis? The point is really simple. They are all there.
They penetrate, produce and are exposed through practices. They are not outside or behind
practices. They are in them. External environments are not really external for example. If
they are outside, they are not there. They are not brought into play in the activities. Then
why study them? It is also an integrated approach, where all the levels of analysis are
represented. In fact, if they are not represented, then why worry about them? Although the13
argument is that levels of analysis, structures and environments are all represented, it does
not necessarily mean that these classifications can be used. They are examples of abstract
categories that serve to order the material in a specific fashion. They have a purpose in
regard to other problems of social science. But in a case study of a single organization, it is
often experienced that the elements that supposedly belong to these categories are mixed
together in strange ways so that it is an abuse to begin to order the material in accordance
with these categories. It gives a wrong impression because the elements that are put in the
different boxes condition each other. They cannot be separated and put in different boxes.
The simple ordering in regard to chronology and context is much better because it is much
more flexible and is more open to complexity.
3. ‘Power must be analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something
which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never
in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is
employed and exercised through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals
circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously
undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting
target; they are always also the elements of its articulation.’ (Foucault, 1976:98)
What about the center then? The answer is simple. There is no center. It does not really
exist. Power circulates and functions in the form of a chain. It is not localized. Power is not.
Power becomes. The resemblance to Weick’s concept ‘organizing’ is straightforward. Power
is exactly and only what it becomes and it is always something that occurs in the interstice;
in the relations between people in a specific context. Individuals are the targets of power but
also the elements of its articulation. The center is an invention of unifying sciences. It is
almost needless to say that the focus on practices is very pragmatic. After all they do exist.
This means also that centers resist definition. Power cannot be defined. When it does not
exist, how can it be defined. It is always in a process of becoming. There is a second reason.
In trying to define a center, what it consists of and what it excludes, it will do serious
violence to the concept. Trying to define power in two or three sentences presents it in a
such simplistic fashion that it becomes meaningless instead of meaningfull. It does not have
a form that it can be defined precisely what elements it consists of and what it does not14
consist of. It resides in how knowledges relate to each other. It is complex, paradoxical and
very fluid.
4.‘One must rather conduct an ascending analysis of power, starting, that is, from its
infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory,
their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power have
been - and continue to be - invested, colonized, utilized, involuted, transformed,
displaced, extended, etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global
domination.’ (Foucault, 1976:99)
One must perform an ascending analysis. Start from a detailed study of concrete
organizational practices. Analyse them piece by piece and put them in the right chronology
and context. Then the larger patterns and their contradictions slowly emerge. More global
phenomena thus gradually emerge through the detailed study of practices. That is, more
general social patterns have to emerge through from a study of specific practices. It is a
bottom-up approach instead of a top-down approach. Thus, genealogy does not refuse the
existence of some order although this order continuously is recreated, transformed or
changed or maybe even totally abandoned. It is continuously in flux and it is not all-
determining. There is always resistance and the order can always be questioned.
5. ‘...basically I do not believe that what has taken place can be said to be
ideological. It is both much more and much less than ideology. It is the production of
effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge - methods of
observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation and research,
apparatuses of control. All this means that power, when it is exercised through these
subtle mechanisms, cannot but evolve, organize and put into circulation of
knowledge, or rather apparatuses of knowledge, which are not ideological
constructs’ (Foucault, 1976:102).
The point is repeated. Patterns of knowledge do not originate in some grand ideology. They
are very concrete and are embedded in methods of observation, techniques of registration
and procedures for investigation and research etc.15
4. Concluding Remarks
‘None of it (genealogical history) does more than mark time. Repetitive and
disconnected it advances nowhere. Since indeed it never ceases to say the same
thing, it perhaps says nothing. It is tangled up into an indecipherable, disorganized
muddle. In a nutshell, it is inconclusive.’ (Foucault, 1980:78, italics added).
Why perform a genealogy then? If it says nothing and is inconclusive. Is that really all that
can be achieved by doing a genealogy? The meticulous and patient documentary work is
wasted or what? Of course not. To reduce it to nothingness is probably what some people
would like to do. It is a critical approach which also tries to bring about the darker side of
organized patterns. To present the knowledges involved in the shaping of social patterns on
more equal footing than the empirical material usually does on the surface. Therefore, it is
also often controversial. Probably some people disapproved of having it published that the
rationality of placing a major bus terminal in the heart of the city of Aalborg was mixed up
in power relations (Flyvbjerg, 1991b). It is not inconclusive. That underestimates the
tactical/interpretive elements in genealogy. And Foucault is well aware of that too.
Genealogy has a purpose. It opens up new perspectives on a matter that has been buried
under some patterns of knowledge that somehow came to dominate. It’s aim is to
problematise these social patterns by analysing ‘the conditions and circumstances under
which these patterns grew evolved and changed’ (Nietzsche, 1887:456). Nietzsche’s
concern here is morals. These are to be considered as nothing but social constructs
fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms. There are no obvious and objective
criteria for truth that makes a specific pattern more legitimate than others.
In organizational analysis, genealogy is intended for similar questioning of social patterns. A
certain organized pattern is one of many possibilities. It is something that emerges and
changes in a complex interplay between many different things. It has a darker side. Certain
knowledges have been pushed away and destroyed. Genealogy is a spokesman for these
knowledges. What is the purpose then? What can people use it for? It does not aim at that
people can make more rational decisions; that is rationality disconnected from power.
Genealogy is grey, not blue (Nietzsche himself opposes blue and grey, 1887:457). But it is
exactly that it opens up new perspectives. To bring in a consciousness that there are other
possibilities, not just one, and in that process brings other factors into the debate.16
‘We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge - and with good reason. We
have never sought ourselves - how could it happen that we could find ourselves’
(Nietzsche, 1887:451).
This is really what it is all about. To make people more aware of themselves. Who are we?
Where do we come from? And why do we do and see things in this specific fashion. It is not
that genealogy seeks to provide a full answer on such questions. Of course not. Genealogies
diverge in relation to how deep they wish go. They can endlessly peel of layer by layer by
layer and be very ambitious. Nietzsche and Foucault were both concerned with questioning
the things, which people have come to take for granted. Whether it was morals (Nietzsche,
1887), madness (Foucault, 1967), punishment (Foucault, 1979a) or sexuality (Foucault,
1978). These endeavours brought them several hundred years back or more to find
explanations of the present. But genealogy can also be more humble and only be a much
smaller step. And it does not necessarily have the longer time frame, even if it is a historical
method. It is also very useful in the shorter time frame. Flyvbjergs (1991b) case study of
rationality and power in urban planning in Aalborg is an excellent example, which in the
main only covered 10-15 years, although he went 500 years back to establish the historical
context. In the main, my own case study of organizational changes will only cover the last 5-
6 years although I have also collected some material that dates almost 200 years back to get
a feeling of the history of my case, but this part does not amount to much. Even in the
shorter time frame the changes are still extremely complex and details matter. Finally a note
on the author. Genealogy is tactical and interpretive. It does not presume to be innocent. The
author must try to define his position in regard to subject of analysis. Where is he talking
from? Again genealogy is a critical approach. This amplifies the obligation of the author to
describe as clearly as possible his own position in the game.17
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